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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Requiring Indigent Seeking Divorce To Pay Cost Of Service
By Publication Held Denial Of Equal Access To Courts
Jeffreys v. Jeffreys'
Plaintiff, living on public assistance, obtained leave of court to
prosecute her divorce action as a poor person.' Unable to locate her
husband, she was granted court permission to have process served by
1. 58 Misc. 2d 1045, 296 N.Y.S.2d 74 (Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 1968).
2. Leave was applied for and obtained in accordance with N.Y. CIV. PRAc.
LAW § 1101(a) (McKinney 1963):
Upon motion of any person, the court in which an action is triable, or to which
an appeal has been or will be taken, may grant permission to proceed as a poor
person. The moving party shall file his affidavit setting forth the amount and
sources of his income and listing his property with its value; that he is unable
to pay the costs, fees and expenses necessary to prosecute or defend the action
or to maintain or respond to the appeal; the nature of the action; sufficient
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publication.' Plaintiff then sought a court order requiring the City of
New York to pay the expense of this publication. In its initial ruling
on the matter rendered with the consent of the City, the court deter-
mined that the New York in forma pauperis statute required the City
to pay this $300 expense.4 Realizing that this ruling may have estab-
lished a costly precedent, the court granted the City's motion to with-
draw its consent and relitigate the issue. On rehearing, contrary to
its initial ruling, the court determined that the expense of publication
was not a "cost," "fee" or "expense" within the meaning of the in
forma pauperis statutes since it was an "auxiliary expense" of litigation
payable to persons other than public officers.' The City, therefore,
was not required by statute to pay this expense. The court further
concluded that it lacked the inherent discretionary power to direct
payment of auxiliary expenses from public funds unless the Constitu-
tion so mandated. Such a mandate was found to exist.
In deciding that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment required the court to direct the City to pay the publication
costs,6 the court first discussed the nature of divorce actions. The
court distinguished divorce proceedings from other civil actions on
the basis that the latter may be resolved out of court while a divorce
may only be granted by "due judicial proceedings. ' 7 The court likened
the state's role as an indispensable party in matrimonial actions to
the state's role in criminal cases. Then, reasoning from analogous
decisions pertaining to the indigent criminal defendant's right of equal
access to appellate review, particularly Griffin v. Illinoiss the court
determined that the cost of publication was an effective barrier to an
indigent's access to the court - the only means whereby she could
procure a divorce - and held that she was consequently "denied the
equal protection of the laws guaranteed to her by the State and Federal
Constitutions."9 To remedy this unconstitutional denial of access to
facts so that the merit of his contentions can be ascertained; and whether any
other person is beneficially interested in any recovery sought and, if so, whether
every such person is unable to pay such costs, fees and expenses ...
This New York in forma pauperis statute is applicable to divorce actions. Smith v.
Smith, 2 N.Y.2d 120, 138 N.E.2d 790, 157 N.Y.S.2d 546 (1956).
3. N.Y. Civ. PRuc. LAW § 308(4) (McKinney 1963). N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw
§ 316(a) (McKinney 1963) directs that notice of service of summons must be
published in two newspapers at least once in each of four successive weeks.
4. Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, 57 Misc. 2d 416, 292 N.Y.S.2d 767 (Sup. Ct. Kings
Co. 1968).
5. Contra, Brown v. Wyman, 59 Misc. 2d 740, 300 N.Y.S.2d 254 (Sup. Ct.
Onondaga Co. 1969). See note 28 infra and accompanying text.
6. In Tamburro v. Trama, 59 Misc. 2d 488, 299 N.Y.S.2d 528 (Westchester Co.
Ct. 1969), the court, while concluding that Jeffreys was not applicable to the issue
therein, expressed "disagreement with the philosophical dicta in that decision." Id.
at 530.
7. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 9.
8. 351 U.S. 12 (1956). The Supreme Court held in Griffin that even the unin-
tentional discrimination against an indigent criminal defendant resulting from requiring
him to provide a transcript in order to obtain appellate review was in effect a denial
of equal access to the courts and thus repugnant to the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment.
9. 296 N.Y.S.2d at 87. The constitutional guarantees are embodied in the pro-
visions of N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11 and U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See note
33 infra.
408 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXIX
court, the court directed the City of New York to pay the publication
expense from public funds.'0
Publication of service represents a substantial expense confront-
ing the indigent seeking a divorce. Attorney's fees are another major
expense in divorce actions; however, the recent formation of legal
aid agencies has significantly alleviated the cost of counsel for the poor,
especially in urban areas." The indigent civil litigant is further
excused from paying various other court fees and costs pursuant to in
forma pauperis statutes in force in many states. While these reforms
have made it easier for the indigent to enforce many of his rights in
the civil courts, the expense of publication often poses a virtually
insurmountable barrier for a poor person seeking a divorce. Jeff reys
represents a major step in tearing down this barrier.
The historical background of in forma pauperis proceedings re-
veals that very early the Court of Chancery permitted paupers to
prosecute an action without payment of costs.' The first legislation
was an English statute enacted during the reign of Henry VII.'3 It
provided that one who proved his poverty to the satisfaction of the
chancellor could have an original writ and writs of subpoena without
costs.' 4 This statute, which remains as part of the common law of
a few states,' 5 furnished the fundamental concept for those in forma
pauperis statutes which have subsequently been enacted in other states.'
10. A provision in the poor persons' statutes confers upon the court similar
authority to order the county or city treasurer to pay a stenographer (not a public
official) the fee for preparing a transcript of a civil trial. N.Y. CIv. PRAc. LAW
§ 1102(b) (McKinney 1963).
11. Mrs. Jeffreys was represented by counsel from the Legal Services Program
of the Office of Economic Opportunity, and the court acknowledged that this was a
test case designed to make new law through the courts under the Program. 296
N.Y.S.2d at 77 & n.1. For a discussion of the purposes of the Program, see Shriver,
Law Reform and the Poor, 17 AM. U.L. Rlv. 1 (1967). A similar case has been filed
by the Baltimore Legal Aid to test the constitutionality of requiring indigents to pay
court costs and an examiner's fee in a divorce action in Maryland. Joyner v. State,
No. 42724A (Cir. Ct. No. 2, Balt., filed July 16, 1969).
12. 1 E. DANIELL, PLEADINGS AND PRACTICE o THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY 38
(6th Am. ed. 1894).
13. Statute of Westminster, 11 HEN. 7, c. 12 (1494). England has since provided
more extensive relief for the indigent civil litigant in the Legal Aid and Advice Bill
of 1949 (12 & 13 GEo. 6, c. 51), discussed in Comment, The British Legal Aid and
Advice Bill, 59 YALE L.J. 320 (1950).
14. The required proof under the statute was that the pauper be not worth five
pounds, exclusive of his wearing apparel and the matters involved in the litigation.
Perry v. Walker, 1 Colly. 229, 63 Eng. Rep. 396 (1844). The statute further provided
for the appointment of "learned Counsel and Attornies," who were to serve without
reward. For a discussion of the right to counsel under contemporary standards, see
Comment, The Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 COLUm. L. REv. 1322 (1966).
Standards under existing in forma pauperis statutes are discussed in Note, Litigation
Costs: The Hidden Barrier to the Indigent, 56 Gro. L.J. 516, 524-27 (1968).
15. McClenahan v. Thomas, 6 N.C. (2 Murph.) 175 (1813); Cowan v. City of
Chester, 2 Del. Co. 234 (C.P. Pa. 1884). According to 1 ALEXANDER'S BRITISH
STATUTES 346 (Coe's ed. 1912), it is still in force in Maryland. The only other
statutory in forma pauperis provision in Maryland provides that the deposit for the
costs of the clerk and sheriff need not be made by a plaintiff who satisfies the judge
by affidavit that he is unable to pay the deposit and whose attorney certifies that the
action is meritorious. MD. ANN. CODE art. 24, § 10(b) (1966). These fees must,
however, eventually be paid; only the initial deposit is deferred.
16. For a resumE of the scant significant reforms of in forma pauperis legisla-
tion in the United States subsequent to the American Revolution, see Silverstein,
Waiver of Court Costs and Appointment of Counsel for Poor Persons in Ciwzl Cases,
2 VALPARAISO U.L. Rlv. 21, 30-31 (1967).
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It has been held that courts have the inherent power to remit fees in
forma pauperis where the legislature has enacted no laws concerning
such relief. 17 The right to proceed in forma pauperis has been provided
legislatively in a majority of the jurisdictions. Thirty-two states, the
District of Columbia, and the federal government have by statute or
court rule implemented means whereby an impoverished individual
may seek judicial remedies without paying court costs and fees.'"
Where a legislature has enacted specific relief provisions, it would
seem that a court could fashion no further relief unless under some
constitutional compulsion.19
The costs and fees from which the pauper is excused vary con-
siderably among the states.2" Although many states forgive the fees
for service of summons accomplished by court or public officers in
all civil cases for an indigent,21 only Ohio is reported to provide for
payment of the cost of procedural notice by newspaper publication.12
17. Martin v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. 289, 168 P. 135 (1917). An indigent
laborer sought to have the jury fees excused in his action to recover damages for
the wrongful death of his minor daughter. The Supreme Court of California held
that courts have the authority, notwithstandinz statutes requiring prepayment of court
fees, to remit those fees for a pauper since California had adopted the English common
law and since "the power of the English common-law courts to remit fees on petition
in forma pauperis did not have its origin in any statute, but was in fact exercised
as one of the inherent powers of the courts themselves, quite independently of statute."
Id. at 137. Thus, it is arguably within the judge's discretion to forgive payment of
court fees in any jurisdiction (such as Maryland) that has adopted the common law
of England and has not specifically denied this discretion by statute. But see Campbell
v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 23 Wis. 490 (1868). One state's constitution has been
interpreted as guaranteeing an indigent plaintiff the right to proceed in forma pauperis
upon proof that he cannot furnish surety for costs. Lewis v. Smith, 21 R.I. 324,
43 A. 542 (1899), construing R.I. CONST. art. I, § 5: "Every person within this state
ought to find a certain remedy, by having recourse to the laws, for all injuries or
wrongs which he may receive in his person, property, or character. He ought to
obtain right and justice freely and without purchase, completely and without denial;
promptly and without delay; conformably to the laws." The New York Constitution
contains no similar provision although it does guarantee the right to due process and
equal protection. See notes 32-33 infra. See also Lassiter v. Lee, 68 Ala. 287 (1880) ;
Schade v. Luppert, 17 Pa. County Ct. 460 (1896) ; Dillingham v. Putnam, 109 Tex. 1,
14 S.W. 303 (1890) ; City of Manitowoc v. Manitowoc & N. Traction Co., 145 Wis. 13,
129 N.W. 925 (1911). But see Beyerback v. Juno Oil Co., 42 Cal. 2d 11, 265 P.2d 1
(1954) ; Pigg v. Brockman, 79 Idaho 233, 314 P.2d 609 (1957).
18, Note, Litigation Costs: The Hidden Barrier to the Indigent, 56 Gzo. L.J. 516,
523 (1968). The federal in forma pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1964), is dis-
cussed in Schmertz, The Indigent Civil Plaintiff in the District of Columbia: Facts
and Commentary, 27 FED. B.J. 235 (1967).
19. Cf. Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, 58 Misc. 2d 1045, 296 N.Y.S.2d 74 (Sup. Ct. Kings
Co. 1968).
20. For a detailed discussion of specific statutes, see Note, Litigation Costs:
The Hidden Barrier to the Indigent, 56 GEo. L.J. 516, 527-32 (1968). The most
widely adopted reform of in forma pauperis procedures is the UNrFORm RcrRocAL
ENFORCEMtNT OP SUPPORT AcT (1952 & 1958 versions), which affords the court
discretion to waive, among other fees and costs, all fees for service of process in
actions falling within the scope of the act. § 14 (1952 version) ; § 15 (1958 version).
All states plus the District of Columbia have adopted one of the two versions.
9C UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 9-10 (Supp. 1967).
21. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 57.081 (1969); N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 1102(d)
(McKinney 1963). But in three states the in forma pauperis statutes explicitly except
any divorce or other domestic actions. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3413 (1959) ; LA. CIv.
CODE ANN. art. 5181 (West 1960) as amended (Supp. 1969) ; TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 20-1629 (1955) (with certain exceptions).
22. Silverstein, Waiver of Court Costs and Appointment of Counsel for Poor
Persons in Civil Cases, 2 VALPARAISO U.L. Rzv. 21, 41 (1967). Cf. McClure v.
McClure, 99 N.J. Eq. 470, 134 A. 518 (1926).
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None of the in forma pauperis laws envelops all the fees incident to
a civil action. It might be expected that legal aid agencies would
have funds available to provide relief from those expenses not defrayed
by the state. But such is not the case according to responses to an
American Bar Foundation questionnaire.28 Few offices had any funds
available for such purpose, and only Little Rock, Arkansas, included
newspaper charges for legal notices in "basic court costs" paid by the
office for the client.24 But even when an office has funds available
to defray the incidental expenses of civil litigation, the purposes for
which they may be used frequently do not include divorce cases.25
Jeffreys is representative of recent litigation to determine what
costs are actually waived under various in forma pauperis statutes.26
If these statutes are construed liberally, courts are less likely to be
confronted with constitutional issues. Such an approach led the Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit to conclude that the federal statute
permitted waiver of the removal bond which is required to secure
the costs incurred by the removal proceedings should it be found that
the case was improperly removed to the federal court.27 And another
lower New York court, notwithstanding Jeffreys, has ruled that the
cost of publishing summons in an annulment action was a cost within
the meaning of the statute.2  But where statutes are construed not to
include a particular expense or where no statute exists, courts will have
to squarely face the constitutionality of requiring an indigent to pay it.
Under existing laws the burden of paying the publication expense
of service of notice is shouldered by the litigant. The weight of this
burden varies considerably among the cities and states."9 While, from
a practical viewpoint, the high cost of publication in New York City
reported in Jeffreys seems to have a harsher effect on the indigent
than lesser sums in other locales, the amount should be of no con-
23. Silverstein, Waiver of Court Costs and Appointment of Counsel for Poor
Persons in Civil Cases, 2 VALPARAISO U.L. Rzv. 21, 38 (1967). The American Bar
Foundation sent questionnaires to legal aid offices in order to gather information
about the in forma pauperis proceedings in several jurisdictions.
24. Id. at 39.
25. Id. at 38-39.
26. See, e.q., Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Superior Court, 255
Cal. App. 2d 575, 63 Cal. Rptr. 366 (Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1967), where the court ruled
that it had the discretion to waive the required security for court costs for an out-of-
state plaintiff who established indigency. Cf. Harris v. Harris, 38 U.S.L.W. 1114
(D.C. Cir. Jan. 14, 1970).
27. Pasquarella v. Santos, No. 7326 (1st Cir., Oct. 6, 1969). 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (a)
(1964) (in forma pauperis) ; 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d) (1964) (security for removal).
28. Brown v. Wyman, 59 Misc. 2d 740, 300 N.Y.S.2d 254 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga
Co. 1969).
29. "If service is by publication, costs of printing vary quite widely in different
cities, the lowest being $10.00 or less in Phoenix, Little Rock, and Knoxville and the
highest $100.00 in Hartford and $150.00 in New York City." Silverstein, Waiver of
Court Costs and Appointment of Counsel for Poor Persons in Civil Cases, 2 VAL-
PARAISO U.L. Riv. 21, 40-41 (1967). MD. R.P. 105(d) (1) requires such notice to be
published once in each of four successive weeks. A recent inquiry by the Maryland
Law Review revealed that the cost of service by publication in the City of Baltimore
approximates seventy dollars, depending upon the length of the notice, if published
in The Daily Record, the Baltimore area legal newspaper.
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stitutional significance."0 Although arguments may be advanced that
requiring an indigent seeking a divorce to pay the publication cost is
violative of the privileges and immunities clause 1 or the due process
clause32 of the fourteenth amendment, a declaration of the require-
ment's unconstitutionality would most firmly be grounded upon the
equal protection clause . 3  "The resurrection of a wider-ranging re-
view when fundamental personal interests are at stake has come under
the guise of equal protection rather than substantive due process."3 4
The equal protection clause was originally intended to secure equal
rights of citizenship for the Negro during Reconstruction. 5 Although
the equal protection clause has been extended to strike down all un-
reasonable discriminations by a state,36 it has retained its greatest
vitality when applied to discriminatory state action against the Negro."'
Throughout its century of existence, the equal protection clause appears
to have been primarily utilized by minorities as an effective prevention
from suppression and infringement of their civil rights by a majority-
controlled state.3" The minorities seeking its protection and the rights
which they seek to protect change with history. In Harper v. Virginia
Board of Elections, 9 wherein the court determined the state poll tax
to be in contravention of the equal protection clause, Justice Douglas
declared:
30. Cf. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), where theSupreme Court declared unconstitutional the nominal poll tax levied upon the voters
of Virginia.
31. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States .... U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
32. ". . . nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law .. " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. "No person shallbe deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." N.Y. CoNsT.
art. I, § 6.
33. "... nor deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws . U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. "No person shall be denied the equalprotection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof." N.Y. CoNsT. art. I,§ 11. For a discussion of the probable inapplicability of the privileges and immunities
and due process clauses to the situation, see Note, Litigation Costs: The Hidden
Barrier to the Indigent, 56 Gxo. L.J. 516, 533-34, 543-44 (1968).
34. Developments in the Law, Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. Rgv. 1065, 1131(1969).
35. See Frank & Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of
the Laws," 50 COLUM. L. Rzv. 131, 167-69 (1950). See also Slaughter-House Cases,
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
36. See Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALnF. L.
Rtv. 341, 364 (1949).
37. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (statutory scheme designed
to prevent interracial marriages) ; McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964)(criminal statutes which imposed a penalty for cohabitation between a Negro and a
white person who were not married and none for cohabitation between those of the
same race) ; Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (de facto segregation of
white and Negro children in public schools) ; Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)(judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants in deeds).
38. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (welfare recipients);Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (small political parties) ; Levy v. Louisiana,391 U.S. 68 (1968) (illegitimate children) ; Griffin v. Illinois 351 U.S. 12 (1956)(indigent criminal defendants); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410(1948) (aliens).
39. 383 U.S. 663 (1966), overruling in part, Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277
(1937).
1969]
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...the Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to the political
theory of a particular era. In determining what lines are uncon-
stitutionally discriminatory, we have never been confined to his-
toric notions of equality. . . .Notions of what constitutes equal
treatment for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do change.4"
Equal protection of the laws does not dictate that every law must
apply equally to every citizen. Because not all people are afflicted
with the same problems, legislatures may, in order to remedy indi-
vidual problems, classify its citizens according to common problems. 4
Although every classification is, from the perspective of pure logic,
discriminatory, 42 those that are reasonable do not violate the consti-
tutional command of equal protection. "But the classification must be
reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference
having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so
that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." 43
In determining the constitutionality of requiring an indigent to
pay the cost of service by publication, it is necessary to ascertain the
purposes underlying the requirement, the classification of persons
affected by the requirement, and the reasonableness of such classifica-
tion with respect to the purposes. The legislative objectives are then to
be balanced against the resultant encroachment on individual rights.44
Despite its questionable value in many situations, it is reasonably
clear that due process would not allow a legislature to eliminate notice
entirely by dispensing with the minimal requirement of publication
of notice when the defendant spouse cannot be located.45 But the
requirement of publication alone delineates no objectionable classifi-
cation, for it applies with equal force and effect to both the wealthy
and the impoverished. Rather it is the requisite payment of the expense
of newspaper publication that creates a practical distinction between
rich and poor upon its application. The primary purpose of requiring
a litigant to bear the cost appears to be simply to avoid the alternative
40. 383 U.S. at 669. As an example of changing notions of equality, Justice
Douglas noted that the "separate-but-equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537 (1896), was overruled with respect to education in Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954). Id. at 669-70. "[W]e have been extremely sensitive when it
comes to basic civil rights . . . and have not hesitated to strike down an invidious
classification even though it had history and tradition on its side." Levy v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968).
41. See, e.g., Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911), where
the Supreme Court held reasonable a classification prohibiting the pumping of mineral
waters and carbonic acid gas for the purpose of vending it apart from the waters as
distinguished from permitting such pumping for other purposes where the legislative
purpose was to prevent the waste and impairment of the state's natural mineral waters.42. "It is the essence of a classification that upon the class are cast ... burdens
different from those resting upon the general public. . . . Indeed, the very idea of
classification is that of inequality. Atchison, T..& S.F. R.R. v. Matthews, 174
U.S. 96, 106 (1899).
43. F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
44. See Note, Litigation Costs: The Hidden Barrier to the Indigent, 56 Gto. L.J.
516, 536 (1968). See also Asbury Hosp. v. Cass County, 326 U.S. 207, 214 (1945);
Southern Ry. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400, 417 (1910).
45. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965) ; Blinn v. Nelson, 222
U.S. 1 (1911). But see 20 SYR. L. Riv. 973, 977 (1969).
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of defraying the expense by use of state funds.46 An additional justifi-
cation is the prevention of frivolous suits.47 With respect to the pur-
pose of avoiding disbursement of state funds, there is no question that
the classification - all litigants seeking a divorce - reasonably accom-
plishes that purpose. As compared to the purpose of preventing ground-
less divorce actions, however, the classification fails to attain its
objective because only poor persons are effectively prevented ;4s further-
more, the broad classification is defective for it applies with equal
force to those whose claims are not frivolous. Thus, the classification
of all persons seeking a divorce is arguably unreasonable when com-
pared with the goal of preventing frivolous divorce actions since it
both includes more persons than only those whose claims are frivolous
and fails to include many whose claims are frivolous.49 Since this
broad classification reasonably accomplishes only the purpose of pro-
tecting state coffers, the constitutionality of requiring the indigent to
pay the newspaper charges for publication may depend upon whether
the achievement of this goal outweighs the rather effective barrier to
the indigent's access to the courts for the obtention of a divorce."
When fundamental personal interests are at stake, courts fre-
quently resort to the balancing method of determining constitutionality
under the equal protection clause by weighing the legislative purpose
of a law against its impairment of individual rights.5 ' Preferential
treatment is accorded to personal interests as opposed to economic
interests. 52 Certainly one's right, albeit state granted and controlled,
to associate and disassociate with another in the relationship of husband
and wife should be deemed a very personal interest.5"
46. "[A] State . . .may protect itself so that . . . public moneys [are] not
needlessly spent." Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 24 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring). "In the English court system, fees were paid by the litigants for writs and
services performed by the court officials to defray the cost of administering thejudicial machinery and to provide incomes to judges and court officers .... Although
the two justifications for the fee system have for the most part disappeared, fees
continue to be charged as vestiges of a past era." Note, Litigation Costs: The
Hidden Barrier to the Indigents, 56 Gto. L.J. 516, 518-19 (1968). Since the publica-
tion cost is not paid to the court or state, the requirement is unlikely rooted in the
traditional fee system.
47. See Lowe v. Kansas, 163 U.S. 81, 85 (1896).48. Those persons whose incomes are slightly greater than the income levels of
indigency and those whose incomes might be considered moderate may also be deterredfrom commencing a frivolous divorce suit; however, they at least have the opportunity
to exercise a choice.
49. For a discussion of the unconstitutionality of under-inclusive and over-inclusive classifications, see Developments in the Law, Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L.
Rxv. 1065, 1084-87 (1969).
50. Cf. Note, Litigation Costs: The Hidden Barrier to the Indigents, 56 Gno.L.J. 516, 536 (1968). Both of these purposes were considered legitimate by the court
in Boddie v. Connecticut, 286 F. Supp. 968, 973 (D. Conn. 1968), in requiring anindigent to pay a filing fee for a divorce; but the court failed to discuss whether the
classification was appropriate to achieve these goals.
51. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) ; Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353 (1963).
52. "[T]he different treatment of personal interests seems to rest upon a belief
that they are simply more important than others." Developments in the Law, Equal
Protection, 82 HARV. L. Rrv. 1065, 1128 (1969).
53. See Foster, Marriage: A "Basic Civil Right of Man;" 2 FAMILY L.Q. 90(1968). Cf. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.535 (1942) ; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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[U]nder the fundamental interests theory a classification maybe held invalid even though it is not invidious and even though
it is reasonably related to a legitimate public purpose. A court
applying this theory will weigh the benefits flowing from pursuit
of the state's objective against the detriments resulting from the
impairment of a basic personal interest. 4
The personal interest involved in divorce is impaired by requiring
an indigent to pay the publication cost which results in denial of accessto courts. In a recent decision the Supreme Court declared the Vir-ginia antimiscegenation statutes unconstitutional, one of which "auto-
matically voids all marriages between 'a white person and a colored
person' without any judicial proceeding. . . ."" The problem inJeffreys is the reverse: the indigent is unable to enter the courthouse
to void the marriage. But common to both is the lack of access to
courts impairing the personal interests of the parties.
Notwithstanding the state's vast power to regulate marriage anddivorce,"8 its powers are not without constitutional boundaries."7 "Thefact that the legislature might entirely abolish the right of access tothe courts for purposes of divorce and annulment does not imply thepower to make the exercise of those rights conditional upon a sur-
render of constitutional guarantees."5 " A state may not impose un-
constitutional conditions on the exercise of a right even though the
right is granted entirely at the pleasure of the state.59
Increased recognition by the courts that poverty adversely affects
a person's ability to exercise his rights in the judicial process com-
menced in the sphere of criminal procedure. In Griffin v. Illinois,O
54. Developments in the Law, Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. Rev. 1065, 1132
(1969).
55. Lorrving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 4 (1967) (emphasis added).56. Marriage . . . has always been subject to the control of the legislature.That body prescribes the ge mat which parties may contract to marry, the procedureor form essential to constitute marriage, the duties and obligations it creates, itseffect upon the property rights of both, present and prospective, and the acts whichmay constitute grounds for its dissolution." Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888).See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); Crane v. Meginnis, 1 Gill &
Johns. 463, 474 (Md. 1829). See generally Monahan, State Legislation and Control
of Marriage, 2 J. FAMILY L. 30 (1962).57. Although "marriage is a social relation subject to the State's police power...the State does not contend in its argument before this Court that its powers toregulate marriage are unlimited notwithstanding the commands of the FourteenthAmendment. Nor could it do so. . . ." Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967).58. People v. Connell, 2 Ill. 2d 332, 118 N.E.2d 262, 267 (1954), wherein thecourt declared a legislative act unconstitutional that required a person to file a writtenintention to file a complaint sixty days before filing the complaint for divorce becausethe delay was interposed before jurisdiction is obtained and, therefore, the litigant's
right to seek immediate redress in court is violated.
59. Cf. Power Mfg. Co. v. Saunders, 274 U.S. 490 (1927), where it was decidedthat a foreign corporation, by obtaining permission to do business in a state, neednot subject itself to an unconstitutional statute which allows an action to be broughtagainst a foreign corporation in any county of the state but restricts venue for adomestic corporation to the county in which the domestic corporation does business;Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U.S. 494 (1926), where the Supreme Courtheld that, even though a state may forbid a foreign corporation to do business withinits jurisdiction, a state may not make past compliance with an unconstitutional taxa condition precedent to renewal of the license.
60. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
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the Supreme Court ordered the state to provide transcripts of criminal
trials free to indigents since the state required a transcript for full
appellate review. Although the state was under no duty to provide
for an appeal from criminal convictions, where the state chose to afford
this privilege, it could not discriminate in a practical manner against
those unable to pay the cost of a transcript. Justice Black, speaking for
four members of the Court, stated that "[t]here can be no equal
justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount
of money he has."'" Griffin imposed an affirmative duty upon the
state to alleviate the natural disadvantages resulting from poverty
when an indigent's basic civil rights are denied by state action.
The Griffin principle has been extended into other areas of criminal
procedure: court-appointed counsel on appeal,62 transcripts of habeas
corpus hearing,63 and filing fees in habeas corpus and on appeal.64 justice
Douglas clearly indicated in Douglas v. California5 that "[a]bsolute
equality is not required .... But where the merits of the one and only
appeal an indigent has as of right are decided without benefit of
counsel, we think an unconstitutional line has been drawn between
rich and poor."66 Mrs. Jeffreys likewise has only one way of obtaining
a divorce - through the courts. The courts' awareness of poverty's
effect on the exercise of civil rights has expanded beyond the criminal
procedure sphere. In Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,7 the
Supreme Court held that a state poll tax violated the equal protection
clause as an unreasonable classification based on wealth. In this appli-
cation of the Griffin doctrine to the right of franchise, the Court
declared, "Lines drawn on the basis of wealth or property . . . are
traditionally disfavored."68
The constitutionality of requiring an indigent seeking a divorce
to pay certain fees has been decided by two other courts. In Boddie
v. Connecticut,6" decided prior to Jeffreys, a similar issue of requiring
payment of a filing fee for divorce was resolved against the welfare
women who sought a declaration of the requirement's unconstitu-
tionality. In denying the applicability of Griffin and Harper to the
situation, the three-judge federal district court reasoned that there
was a distinction between imprisonment and denial of voting rights
and ordinary civil actions, the first two being "of particular concern
to the framers of the Constitution and Bill of Rights and the post-
Civil War amendments." 70 But the original intention of the framers
of the equal protection clause was to secure individual rights in civil
matters as well as in criminal prosecutions ;71 thus, there is a consti-
61. Id. at 19.
62. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
63. Long v. District Court, 385 U.S. 192 (1966).
64. Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961) ; Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959).
65. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
66. Id. at 357.
67. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
68. Id. at 668.
69. 286 F. Supp. 968 (D. Conn. 1968). Motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis on appeal to the Supreme Court has been granted. 89 S. Ct. 2138 (1969).
70. 286 F. Supo. at 973.
71. See Frank & Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of
the Laws," 50 COLUM. L. Rev. 131, 167-68 (1950).
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tutional concern for the civil litigant as well as for the criminal
defendant embodied in those constitutional provisions mentioned in
Boddie. Another factor considered by the court in Boddie was that
the direct state action present in criminal cases was absent in a divorce
action. While the state action affecting divorce is perhaps not of the
same degree, the vast legislative control over divorce, including the
requirement of published notice in an appropriate case, represents
significant state action. 72  Jeffreys, contrary to Boddie, considered
divorce to be considerably more than an ordinary civil case and char-
acterized the state as acting in a third-party capacity to protect its
interests. 73 The Jeffreys opinion refers to Boddie as representing "a
laudable abstention attitude by a federal court. ' 74 Boddie is distin-
guishable from Jeffreys in that Connecticut has no in forma pauperis
laws providing any relief for the poor from costs in the civil courts;
concluding that it had no inherent power to grant such relief, the
court decided that any change must come from the legislature.7 5
In Suber v. Suber,76 decided subsequent to but apparently in-
dependent of and without reliance on Jeffreys, requiring a plaintiff onpublic assistance to pay the sixty dollar publication cost in a divorce
action was declared unconstitutional. The Suber opinion summarily
distinguished Boddie on the basis that New Jersey had by statute
eliminated all costs in a divorce action except the publication fee. As
in Jeffreys, Suber was grounded upon the Griffin doctrine that once
a privilege is granted, a state may not impose unreasonable distinctions
based upon indigency that impede open and equal access to the courts.
"It becomes a subterfuge to provide a procedure for indigents to
secure divorces and then make relief hinge upon payment of a cost
which the plaintiff is unable to pay." 77
Whether or not a state forgives by statute other court fees and
costs for indigents seeking a divorce should not be determinative of
the constitutionality of requiring the payment of the publication ex-
pense. In either situation an effective barrier prevents the indigent's
access to the divorce court. The existence or non-existence of other
impediments should not affect the constitutionality of this barrier. In
Griffin the Court struck down the barrier of a costly transcript even
though other impediments existed at the time, such as lack of court-
appointed counsel on appeal, an impediment subsequently removed as
also unconstitutional.7" Thus, the Jeffreys court would probably reach
the same conclusion were it in a state, such as Maryland,79 where
little or no in forma pauperis relief was provided.
Whether this impediment is considered unconstitutional will largely
depend upon the courts' willingness to extend the Griffin doctrine into
72. Cf. Developments in the Law, Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. Rlv. 1065,
1069-72 (1969).
73. See, e.g., Lickle v. Boone, 187 Md. 579, 585, 51 A.2d 162, 165 (1947).
74. 296 N.Y.S.2d at 87.
75. See also Frederick v. Schwartz, 296 F. Supp. 1321 (D. Conn. 1969).
76. No. M-2366-68 (Super. Ct. Union Co., N.J., Aug. 25, 1969).
77. Id. at 4-5.
78. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
79. See note 15 supra.
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the civil sphere. In a somewhat analogous situation, the Supreme
Court declined to review the constitutionality of an eviction statute
which requires a tenant to furnish a security bond before he can defend
on the merits his rights against a dispossessory warrant.8 0 Tenants
lacking sufficient funds are evicted without a previous hearing solely
because they cannot afford the security bond to cover the amount of
rent the landlord claims is due. However, although temporarily ousted,
the tenant may regain any loss he suffers if he subsequently can prove
at a trial that he was entitled to possession. Furthermore, an evicted
indigent may perhaps obtain another place in which to live while a
divorce may be had only through the courts. Loss of tenancy affects
one's economic interests while being unable to obtain a divorce impairs
personal interests which are traditionally accorded preferential treat-
ment.8 ' Thus, the problem in Jeffreys is more akin to the problem in
Griffin; both affect personal liberties and interests and in both redress
may be had only through the judicial system."2
Eliminating the publication cost requirement for those unable to
afford it would unquestionably increase the number of divorces among
the impoverished. But the financial burden of divorce has not in the
past improved the social and family life of the poverty-stricken. 3 And
permitting a divorce is predicated on the notion that the state no longer
has any interest in preserving the marriage ;84 therefore, society will not
suffer by this increase but may indeed benefit if the welfare woman is
free to remarry a husband who can support her and her children.
Should those statutes which require the indigent to pay the publi-
cation cost for notice of a divorce suit be declared unconstitutional, a
state could make several responses. It might simply disallow any
80. Williams v. Shaffer, 385 U.S. 1037 (1967). The state court held the issue
moot since the tenants had already been evicted. 222 Ga. 334, 149 S.E.2d 668 (1966).
Dissenting from the denial of certiorari, Justice Douglas declared:
The effect of the security statute is to grant an affluent tenant a hearing and
to deny an indigent tenant a hearing. The ability to obtain a hearing is thus
made to turn upon the tenant's wealth. On numerous occasions this Court has
struck down financial limitations on the ability to obtain judicial review .... It
is true that these cases have dealt with criminal proceedings. But the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not limited to criminal prose-
cutions. Its protections extend as well to civil matters.
385 U.S. at 1039 (citations omitted).
81. See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
82. Cf. In re Karren, 159 N.W.2d 402 (Minn. 1968), where it was held that an
indigent who appeals from a civil judgment terminating her parental rights is entitled
to a free transcript of the proceedings in juvenile court.
83. It may be argued that economic compulsion to remain married and the
expense of divorce serve the socially desirable purpose of promoting family
stability. In our society, however, such rarely is the case. In real life, the parties
become estranged, and when able to do so form new informal family relation-
ships. Poverty usually promotes extra-legal action rather than a resignation to
and endurance of an intolerable situation. The poor resort to desertion and propo-
gate illegitimate children in large measure because law has priced itself out
of the market.
Foster & Freed, Unequal Protection: Poverty and Family Law, 42 IND. L.J. 192,
200 (1967). "Desertion has become known as 'the poor man's divorce'." tenBroek,
California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and Present
Status, (Pt. 3), 17 STAN. L. Rgv. 614, 617 (1965). "The high cost of divorce may
even be a cause of family breakup." Hammer, Divorce Reform in California: The
Governor's Commission on the Family and Beyond, 9 SANTA CLARA LAWY]R 32,
50 (1968).
84. See, e.g., Dougherty v. Dougherty, 187 Md. 21, 48 A.2d 451 (1946).
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notice by publication and instead require personal service in any
divorce action. This extreme solution would preclude the obtention
of a divorce from any spouse who has disappeared. Or the state might
provide free publication for all regardless of financial status. Neither
of these solutions is likely to engender much public or legislative
support. The probable approach would be to use the existing in forma
pauperis structure and include publication costs as an item to be paid
by the state under court direction upon establishing personal poverty. 5
In his opinion in Jeffreys, Justice Sobel recognized the burden his de-
cision would impose upon the City and recommended that publication
requirements be reduced and newspaper rates be fixed by agreement.8 6
Jeffreys is a logical extension of the Griffin doctrine into the
sphere of civil law. Affirmance of Jeffrey 8 7 would not result in a
constitutional mandate that the state must pay all the expenses and
provide counsel for poor litigants in all civil actions, for in no other
civil matter are such intimate personal interests involved. Marriage
and its dissolution are far more closely related to criminal procedures
than other civil matters because of the important role played by the
state in protecting its interests in marriage and divorce. Matrimonial
matters are subject to comprehensive state regulation and remedy may
be sought only through the courts. Indeed, the state's interest, as
exemplified by vast regulations, and the individual's personal interest
in marriage and divorce approach an equality with similar interests
in the criminal process.
It is not hard to understand the cynicism of the people of
the ghetto towards our legal system as an outlet for grievances
and disputes. A person charged with a criminal offense is brought
before the bar of justice expeditiously. He is given a free trial,
free lawyer and, if necessary, free appeals. Yet a deserted woman,
who feels as imprisoned as a convict and who may be able to
free society of the burden of supporting her if she could remarry,
is denied the relief of our courts. It is unjust to give better
treatment to those who break society laws than to those who
attempt to live by the rule of law and order.88
85. Cf. Comment, Discriminations Against the Poor and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 81 HARV. L. Rnv. 435, 444-46 (1967).
86. 296 N.Y.S.2d at 89. The Suber court left to the state's discretion the
administrative problem of which department of the state should pay the cost of
publication. The court did make an interesting suggestion:
This entire question would be moot if the same newspaper which screams with
selfrighteous indignation at the injustices practiced on the poor was to waive
publication costs on certification of indigency by the Legal Services Corporation.
Newspapers make a large portion of their profits on legal advertising. In
comparison with that large amount of business, the number of in forma pauperis
divorces is miniscule. The number of those cases requiring publication is still
smaller. This cost could easily be absorbed.
Suber v. Suber, No. M-2366--68 at 5 (Super. Ct. Union Co., N.J., Aug. 25, 1969).
87. The court noted, "Such a holding by a trial court in a test case such as this
serves merely the purpose of moving the issue to those appellate courts which must
finally determine it." 296 N.Y.S.2d at 87.
88. No. M-2366-68 at 5.
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